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Plessy v. Ferguson and the  
Anti-Canon 
Akhil Reed Amar* 
 In the spirit of the symposium generally, I want to step back a bit and 
not limit myself to Plessy v. Ferguson,1 which, frankly, is a turkey shoot.  
It’s easy.  Barry McDonald’s got a very difficult job to defend it.2  Let me 
try to pull the camera back and talk more generally about what these cases 
that we’re talking about today have in common.  To do that, I want to 
comment on what we might think of as the canon and the anti-canon of 
Supreme Court cases.  Here I build upon thoughtful work by, among others, 
Professor Richard Primus.3  In so doing, in talking about canon and anti-
canon, I would like to preview my new book that’s coming out, America’s 
Unwritten Constitution,4 because I’m going to be building on some of these 
ideas.  It is a complement to the last thing that I did, America’s Constitution: 
A Biography, that tries to take the reader through the written document, the 
canonical text.5  The Constitution is very compact.  I try to take the reader 
really from start to finish: from the Preamble through every article, and then 
through every amendment.  The thought of the new book is that the 
Constitution is not all that we believe it to be.  It proclaims itself the 
supreme law of the land, and yet all of us understand that there is more to it 
than that.  There is also a canon and an anti-canon of decisions. 
 
     * Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale University.  These remarks were 
delivered at the Pepperdine Law Review’s April 1, 2011 Supreme Mistakes symposium, exploring 
the most maligned decisions in Supreme Court history, and edited by the symposium organizers and 
Law Review editors. 
 1.  163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 2.  See Barry P. McDonald, A Reluctant Apology for Plessy: A Response to Akhil Amar, 39 
PEPP. L. REV. 91 (2011). 
 3.  Richard Primus defines the anti-canonical body of law simply as those decisions that were 
later rejected by canonical decisions.  Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 
48 DUKE L.J. 243, 254 (1998).  He further states that the anti-canon may include “the set of the most 
important constitutional texts that we . . . regard as . . . repulsive.”  Id. at 254 n.41.  See also Gerard 
N. Magliocca, Preemptive Opinions: The Secret History of Worcester v. Georgia and Dred Scott, 63 
U. PITT. L. REV. 487, 487 (2002) (“[A] few legal classics . . . are often not read today because they 
stand as examples of a judicial system gone wrong.”). 
 4.  AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION (forthcoming early 2012). 
 5.  AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY (2005). 
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Erwin Chemerinsky began by giving you his general criteria.  I’m going 
do it the other way around.  I’m going to try to persuade you that all of us in 
the room, as well-socialized Americans, law students, and law professors, 
understand that there are certain things that are constantly canonical, and 
correlatively things that are absolutely anti-canonical. 
Let me start with America’s symbolic Constitution—these great iconic 
symbols that unite us.  The written Constitution is our Queen Elizabeth.  It’s 
what brings us together, but it’s hardly the only thing. 
I am looking for symbols that are textual, like the Constitution.  I want 
to focus on texts that have propositions that are in some sense deeply 
connected to the Constitution, proximate to it, that have been ratified in 
some profound way, formally or informally, by the American people in the 
same manner that the Constitution has come to abide in our hearts and 
minds. 
Accepting these criteria, something outside the Constitution and yet 
absolutely iconic, there are probably a couple of dozen textual symbols that 
conform.  I offer six examples: The Declaration of Independence,6 Federalist 
Papers,7 The Gettysburg Address,8 Martin Luther King Jr.’s “I Have a 
Dream” speech,9 Brown v. Board of Education,10 and the Northwest 
Ordinance.11  Of course, we could also talk just about iconic cases: Marbury 
v. Madison12 and McCulloch v. Maryland13 are the big ones.  The point is 
that these documents and cases form a constitutional canon. 
Conversely, there is a counter-canon.  I want to tell you a little bit about 
the connection between the canon and the anti-canon, which I detail in my 
forthcoming book on America’s symbolic Constitution.14  Several 
constituent symbols of our constitutional identity are negative, crystallizing 
what America today rejects, indeed abhors.  In particular, three court 
opinions occupy the lowest circle of constitutional hell: Dred Scott,15 Plessy 
v. Ferguson,16 and Lochner v. New York.17 
 
 6.  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). 
 7.  The Federalist Papers, originally published in 1787 and 1788 in various New York 
newspapers, are available in several collections.  See, e.g., ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES 
MADISON & JOHN JAY, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (SoHo Books 2011) (1787–88). 
 8.  President Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863) [hereinafter Gettysburg 
Address], in 7 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 22 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). 
 9.  Martin Luther King, Jr., Speech: I Have a Dream (Aug. 28, 1963) [hereinafter I Have a 
Dream Speech], in THE WORDS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 95 (Coretta Scott King ed., 2d ed. 
2008). 
 10.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 11.  Ordinance of 1787: The Northwest Territorial Government, 1 U.S.C., at LV (2006). 
 12.  5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 13.  17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 14.  AMAR, supra note 4. 
 15.  60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV. 
 16.  163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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Each case presents an example of unwritten constitutionalism run amok, 
and reminds us of the need to place principled limits on judges who venture 
beyond the text and original understanding of the Constitution.  Sometimes 
judges should and must do so, but we need to be very attentive to why the 
Court went too far in such cases.  We must try to figure this out by using 
democratic collective criteria, not our idiosyncratic views.  We all recognize 
that certain decisions are either great or awful.  We know these when we see 
them.  The interesting question is why.  What is it about these opinions that 
either elicits our great affection and allegiance or provokes revulsion? 
Before turning to these three cases, it’s worth pondering what general 
factors seem to be at work in shaping how the judicial actions of one era are 
evaluated by later generations of judges and citizens.  Clearly not all cases 
that are overruled by a later court or a later constitutional amendment come 
to be demonized.  For example, no one on the modern Court or in the legal 
academy cites the 1833 case of Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore,18 though 
Barron’s vision of a world in which states and localities are free to ignore 
the Bill of Rights with impunity19 is anathema to modern sensibility.  Think 
about what the world would be like without applying the Bill of Rights 
against states. 
Just toss out the most famous Bill of Rights cases that pop into your 
head, whether you agree with them or not: Miranda,20 Griswold,21 Lawrence 
v. Texas,22 New York Times v. Sullivan.23  Not a single one of those is 
actually a Bill of Rights case.  Sullivan is about Alabama libel law.24  Our 
iconic Bill of Rights cases are really Fourteenth Amendment cases, which 
incorporate the Bill of Rights.25  So that world is actually unimaginable, the 
world of Barron v. Baltimore, and yet it’s not anti-canonical.  It’s not 
reviled. 
 
 17.  198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 18.  32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
 19.  See id. at 247–51. 
 20.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 21.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 22.  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 23.  376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 24.  Id. at 283–84. 
 25.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564 (deciding “whether the petitioners were free as adults to engage 
in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution”); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 282–83 (interpreting the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments as to an official privilege defense to a libel suit); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 
347 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1954) (deciding whether segregation based on race of school children was 
constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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Some might think this generosity towards Barron is simply because the 
ruling is moot.  The Fourteenth Amendment overruled the case,26 and that’s 
that.  But is it?  The Fourteenth Amendment, after all, was designed to 
overrule not one, but two, major Supreme Court cases: Barron on the 
inapplicability of the Bill of Rights to the states, and Dred Scott on the 
impossibility of black citizenship.27  Yet these two overruled cases receive 
sharply different treatment in modern constitutional discourse. 
Dred Scott is openly trashed, not merely by many of America’s best 
scholars, but by Justices of all stripes.28  Not so with Barron.  Is the answer 
simply that Dred Scott was racist and pro-slavery, and that is morally 
repugnant when judged by today’s standards?  This is surely part of the 
answer, but many other antebellum era cases with racist and pro-slavery 
bottom lines are not demonized, nor even remembered today, except maybe 
by our resident expert, Paul Finkelman. 
 Consider, for example, the 1851 Supreme Court case of Strader v. 
Graham,29 which reaches a pro-slavery result in a setting similar to Dred 
Scott.  Raise your hand if you had ever heard of Strader v. Graham before.  
There are seven people who are raising their hands.  All law professors, I 
believe, and several of them among America’s most distinguished legal 
 
 26.  See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3033 (2010) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he 
chief congressional proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment espoused the view that the 
Amendment made the Bill of Rights applicable to the States and, in so doing, overruled this Court’s 
decision in Barron.”). 
 27.  See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 
1193 (1992): 
 Surely the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were entitled to rely on Supreme 
Court interpretations in Dred Scott no less than in Barron, even as they sought to overrule 
them using “Simon Says” language suggested by the Court itself.  And once again, it is 
clear that they did so rely.  John Bingham, the main author of Section One, not only cited 
to Dred Scott in a speech before the House in early 1866, but quoted the following key 
language: “The words ‘people of the United States’ and ‘citizens’ are synonymous 
terms.”  In the Senate debates on the Fourteenth Amendment, the most extended and 
authoritative discussion of Section One came from Jacob Howard, and he too made plain 
that the language chosen was in response to Dred Scott . . . . 
Id. at 1223 (footnotes omitted); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1 (“All persons born or 
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside.”). 
 28.  See, e.g., Mark Graber, “No Better Than They Deserve:” Dred Scott and Constitutional 
Democracy, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 589 (2007): 
Instead of building upon those strands in the American constitutional tradition that 
celebrated equality and freedom, the judicial majority, when holding that former slaves 
could not become American citizens and that human bondage could not be prohibited in 
American territories, privileged those aspects of the American constitutional tradition that 
celebrated racism and slavery.  At best, Dred Scott left Americans governed no better 
than they would have been in the absence of judicial review and constitutional limitations 
on federal power. 
Id. at 590 (footnotes omitted). 
 29.  51 U.S. (10 How.) 82 (1851). 
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historians.  It seems clear, then, that we remember Dred Scott, but not 
Strader v. Graham. 
It is also notable that there is so little modern outrage directed towards 
Minor v. Happersett,30 which in 1875 ruled that women had no 
constitutional right to vote.31  Just as Dred Scott’s racist result was overruled 
by the Fourteenth Amendment,32 so Minor’s sexist result was overruled by 
the Nineteenth Amendment.33  Why, then, the different reputations of these 
two cases?  The answer is twofold.   
First, Barron and Minor were not merely plausible, but plainly correct 
interpretations of the written Constitution as it existed when these cases were 
decided.34  Strader was at least a plausible decision, pro-slavery, yes, but not 
egregiously more pro-slavery than the antebellum Constitution itself was, if 
read fairly.  Dred Scott, by contrast, was a preposterous garbling of the 
Constitution, as publicly understood when ratified and amended early on, 
and was harshly criticized on precisely these grounds by notable 
contemporaries.35  In 1858, Abraham Lincoln famously called the case “an 
astonisher in legal history.”36  I think if you looked at the Oxford English 
Dictionary, that’s the first use of the word “astonisher.”37  And he gives us 
the Gettysburg Address, which is iconic for just the reasons outlined 
earlier.38  Here, we see the significance of America’s written Constitution.  
Whatever government officials might think they can get away with at the 
time, in the long run it does seem to matter whether their actions—such as 
 
 30.  88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875). 
 31.  Id. at 177–78. 
 32.  See U.S. CONST. amend XIV (guaranteeing equal protection to all citizens of the United 
States); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3060 (2010) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he 
Fourteenth Amendment[] significantly altered our system of government [and] . . . unambiguously 
overruled this Court’s contrary holding in Dred Scott . . . .”). 
 33.  U.S. CONST. amend XIX (requiring that the right of citizens to vote not be denied based on 
gender). 
 34.  See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 140–45 
(1998) [hereinafter AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS] (“[A]s a matter of textual exegesis and application of 
lawyerly rules of construction, Marshall’s argument [in Barron] is hard to beat.”); Akhil Reed Amar 
& Jed Rubenfeld, A Dialogue, 115 YALE L.J. 2015, 2023 (2006) (discussing Minor in its historical 
context). 
 35.  See AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 34, at 181–82 (discussing Congressman John 
Bingham’s sentiment in 1859 that Dred Scott had “gone too far”); see also Akhil Reed Amar, 
Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 62 (2000) (“Chief Justice 
Taney’s infamous opinion in Dred Scott . . . . was an outlandish reading of the [Constitution] . . . .”). 
 36.  Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Chicago, Illinois (July 10, 1858) [hereinafter Speech at 
Chicago], in 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 495 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). 
 37.  THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 522 (1933) (listing 1871 as the first year the word 
astonisher was used, well after Lincoln’s use of the word in 1858). 
 38.  Gettysburg Address, supra note 8. 
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the Sedition Act of 179839 or Watergate40—treated the Constitution’s text 
and structure with respect or with contempt. 
Second, Dred Scott ran counter to the Northwest Ordinance, whose free 
soil spirit had been declared unconstitutional.41  Lincoln, from the original 
Northwest, rose to fame as a result of his early criticism of Dred, became 
President on an anti-Dred platform,42 and in his opening sentence at 
Gettysburg, challenged Dred’s dismissive treatment of the equality language 
of the Declaration (another one of our six icons).43  So Dred ran counter not 
only to the Northwest Ordinance, but also the Gettysburg Address, the 
Declaration of Independence, Dr. King’s speech, and Brown. 
Similarly, Plessy ran counter to Brown precisely because the Northwest 
Ordinance, the Gettysburg Address, the Declaration, and the Brown opinion 
are iconic elements of America’s symbolic Constitution.  Their opposites, 
naturally enough, come in for special revulsion. 
Earlier we saw the significance of the written Constitution.  Now we 
should grasp the significance of the unwritten Constitution, the symbolic 
Constitution.  These symbols connect to each other.   
For some other examples of this symbolic connection, here are some 
recent Supreme Court opinions pairing the anti-canon cases.  Here’s Justice 
Thomas linking Dred Scott and Plessy in Parents Involved: “[I]f our history 
has taught us anything, it has taught us to beware of elites bearing racial 
theories. . . .  Can we really be sure that the racial theories that motivated 
Dred Scott and Plessy are a relic of the past . . . ?”44  Earlier opinions 
authored by Justices Powell,45 Black,46 Douglas,47 and Chief Justice 
Warren48 also paired Dred and Plessy. 
Opponents of substantive due process have also evoked Dred and 
Lochner as Exhibits A and B.  In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
 
 39.  Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired 1801). 
 40.  Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution, Written and Unwritten, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
267, 274 (2007) (noting President Nixon’s view that “‘[w]hen the President does it, that means it is 
not illegal’”). 
 41.  Ordinance of 1787: The Northwest Territorial Government, 1 U.S.C., at LV (2006); see also 
AMAR, supra note 5, at 260, 264–68. 
 42.  See ERIC FONER, THE FIERY TRIAL: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND AMERICAN SLAVERY 94–95, 
99–100 (2010).  See also Speech at Chicago, supra note 36. 
 43.  See Gettysburg Address, supra note 8, at 23 (“Four score and seven years ago our fathers 
brought forth on this continent, a new nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition 
that all men are created equal.” (emphasis added)). 
 44.  Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 780–82 (2007) 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
 45.  Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 516 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring). 
 46.  Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 142 n.23 (1961) (Black, Douglas & Warren, JJ., dissenting), 
overruled by Spevak v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967). 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
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Pennsylvania v. Casey,49 Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justices White and Thomas, declared: 
Both Dred Scott and one line of the cases resisting the New Deal 
rested upon the concept of “substantive due process” that the Court 
praises and employs today.  Indeed, Dred Scott was “very possibly 
the first application of substantive due process in the Supreme 
Court, the original precedent for Lochner v. New York and Roe v. 
Wade.”50 
Plessy and Lochner have also operated in tandem in modern case law as 
illustrations of the need for the Court to overrule its erroneous precedents.  
Here is another quote from the Planned Parenthood dissent:   
The “separate but equal” doctrine lasted 58 years after Plessy, and 
Lochner’s protection of contractual freedom lasted 32 years.  
However, the simple fact that a generation or more had grown used 
to these major decisions did not prevent the Court from correcting 
its errors in those cases, nor should it prevent us from correctly 
interpreting the Constitution here.51 
If this analysis is right, we now begin to have an answer to the question 
that Professor Larson proposed to us at the very outset in his wonderful 
remarks.  Lochner should be viewed as a less demonic precedent than Dred 
and Plessy because it’s not visibly paired against a symbolic hero.  In fact, 
one can find those who praise Lochner, and even some who call for its 
revival.52  But one does not hear such calls on the Court itself.  That’s the 
difference between the kooky academics and the grounded Justices.  And in 
modern court opinions, Dred, Plessy, and Lochner all function as vilified 
anti-precedents.  They are typically cited either to assert how different these 
cases are from the view being put forth by the citing Justice, or as epithets 
and insults to hurl against the Justices on the other side who are, according 
to the citer, making a horrible mistake reminiscent of one of these three 
disgraced decisions.53 
 
 49.  505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 50.  Id. at 998 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citation omitted). 
 51.  Id. at 957 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 52.  See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 5, at 475 (discussing Bruce Ackerman’s view that Lochner 
“rests on a highly plausible defense of freedom of contract”). 
 53.  See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 773–78 
(2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (comparing dissent to segregationists by showing similarities to the 
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Almost none of the countless citations to these three cases over the last 
half-century has been remotely favorable, and most have been highly 
derogatory.  Those are just some general observations to illustrate that we 
have a canon (a symbolic Constitution, these iconic texts outside the terse 
text that we call the written Constitution), and we have an anti-canon, and 
we pretty much know what cases fall in each category.   
One of the things that I emphasized about Dred is that Lincoln from day 
one said it was outrageous, a legal astonisher.54  So modern commentators 
are not putting forth an anachronistic view of Dred.  Erwin Chemerinsky 
made a similar observation in opposition to Korematsu—that Justice Jackson 
and Justice Murphy immediately condemned the decision. 
I want to read you what one Justice, John Harlan, said in his dissent in 
Plessy v. Ferguson.55  Initially, note that Harlan was alone in dissent.  Think 
about the audacity of someone to be alone against every other Justice.  He 
says to the rest of them, in effect, “You are all wrong, and I’m right, I’m as 
right as right can be.  History will prove that.”56  Harlan is a great dissenter, 
not just in this case, but in a whole bunch of others.57  He famously dissents 
in Lochner,58 as well as in the case that held the federal income tax 
unconstitutional, which was overruled by a constitutional amendment.59  
Harlan argues that the tax decision will be a disaster for the country.60  He 
also dissents when the Court refuses to apply the Bill of Rights against the 
states.61  Similarly, Harlan dissents when Justice Holmes has a very, very 
narrow conception of freedom of the press in a case called Patterson v. 
Colorado.62 
 
arguments made in Plessy); Casey, 505 U.S. at 984 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) 
(quoting Justice Curtis’s dissent in Dred Scott). 
 54.  See supra text accompanying note 36. 
 55.  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), overruled by Brown v. 
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 56.  See id. at 559; AMAR, supra note 5, at 383. 
 57.  See, e.g., Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 463 (1907) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Lochner 
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 65 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
 58.  Lochner, 198 U.S. at 65 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 59.  Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 652 (1895) (Harlan, J., dissenting), 
overruled by South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988); see also AMAR, supra note 5, at 406. 
 60.  Pollock, 157 U.S. at 638–39 (White, J., dissenting).  Justice White’s dissenting opinion, with 
which Justice Harlan concurs, reads: 
The disastrous consequences to flow from disregarding settled decisions, thus cogently 
described, must evidently become greatly magnified in a case like the present, when the 
opinion of the court affects fundamental principles of the government by denying an 
essential power of taxation long conceded to exist, and often exerted by congress. 
Id. 
 61.  Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552–64 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 62.  Patterson, 205 U.S. at 463 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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Perhaps most significantly here, he dissents in the Civil Rights Cases of 
1883,63 where every other Justice strikes down the Civil Rights Act of 
1875.64  If Harlan is right in Plessy, I think he’s right in the Civil Rights 
Cases.  That’s important because that case belongs on the bad list for today’s 
Court.  Led by former Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court revived that reviled 
case, which is like citing Plessy with approval—which, of course, William 
Rehnquist did as a law clerk to Justice Robert Jackson in the Brown case, 
and then said, “Oh, that was not me, that was Robert Jackson.”65  It was 
William Rehnquist.66  Historian Richard Kluger proves that beyond all 
doubt.67  You can see the revival of this Plessy vision in later opinions by 
Rehnquist himself when he cites, with approval, the Civil Rights Cases of 
1883 in his Violence Against Women Act opinion in United States v. 
Morrison.68 
 Here is what Justice Harlan, the Great Dissenter, an iconic epic 
dissenter, proclaims:  “In my opinion, the judgment this day rendered will, in 
time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in 
the Dred Scott case.”69  Alone in dissent, he is saying, you guys have done 
another Dred Scott.  To be right about that is like Babe Ruth’s called shot.   
Now, why is Harlan so obviously right?  You begin to see now how 
Plessy connects back to Dred Scott and forward to Brown, which is iconic 
and basically embraces the Harlan dissent.70  It connects to Korematsu v. 
United States,71 because the governing precedent at the time of Korematsu 
 
 63.  109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 64.  Id. at 25 (majority opinion). 
 65.  See Adam Liptak, The Memo That Rehnquist Wrote and Had to Disown, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
11, 2005, www.nytimes.com/2005/09/11/weekinreview/11lipt.html: 
In 1971, Newsweek magazine revealed that in 1952, Mr. Rehnquist, then a law clerk to 
Justice Robert H. Jackson, prepared a memorandum called “A Random Thought on the 
Segregation Cases.”  It was written in the first person and bore Mr. Rehnquist’s initials.  
It urged Justice Jackson to reject arguments made by lawyers in Brown v. Board of 
Education, the landmark school desegregation case, and to uphold Plessy v. Ferguson, the 
1896 Supreme Court decision holding that “separate but equal” facilities were 
constitutional. 
Id. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND 
BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 609 (2004). 
 68.  529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000). 
 69.  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), overruled by Brown v. 
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 70.  AMAR, supra note 5, at 476 (“Brown was of course preceded by Plessy; and [the majority in] 
Plessy in turn blessed state segregation laws . . . .”). 
 71.  323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
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was Plessy, not Brown.72  That’s what Bob Pushaw reminded you of, when 
Korematsu is decided, Brown’s not the law of the land, Plessy is.  When you 
read Justice Black’s opinion, he uses the word “segregation.”73  The only 
thing that was upheld in Korematsu was not the internment order itself, but 
an evacuation order.74  President Roosevelt ordered all Japanese-Americans 
to leave the West Coast.  You have to stay the heck away from the Golden 
Gate Bridge.  You have to separate yourself.  You have to—and here’s the 
word he uses: “segregate.”75  So what’s the law at the time of Korematsu?  
It’s Plessy, which holds that racial segregation—separate but equal—is 
okay.  And by the way, we really don’t care that much about equal.  That’s 
Plessy, that’s Korematsu.  Now, you begin to see these linkages between 
anti-canon and canon: Dred, Plessy, Korematsu, on the one hand, and folks 
like Lincoln and Harlan on the other.   
Harlan’s argument in Plessy makes four points.  First, he takes a legal 
realist tack: He knows it when he sees it, and he knows what this is all 
about—degrading black people.  He says: We all know the social meaning 
of this law.76  Harlan shares that “[t]he destinies of the two races, in this 
country, are indissolubly linked together, and the interests of both require 
that the common government of all shall not permit the seeds of race hate to 
be planted under the sanction of law.”77  So the Louisiana law is about 
dividing us, even though we are one people.78  Here you begin to hear 
echoes of Martin Luther King’s Dream speech,79 which builds on Harlan’s 
 
 72.  Brown was not decided until 1954, ten years after the Korematsu decision.  Id.; Brown, 347 
U.S. 483. 
 73.  Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223 (“[Congress] decided that the military urgency of the situation 
demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West Coast . . . .”). 
 74.  Id. at 223–24.  The Supreme Court upheld the exclusion of Japanese citizens from certain 
areas of the West Coast at the beginning of the war with Japan during World War II, finding that 
such precautionary measures were necessary to prevent invasion, espionage, or worse.  Id. at 216–
18, 223–24. 
 75.  Id. at 223. 
 76.  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 560 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), overruled by Brown v. 
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954): 
The present decision, it may well be apprehended, will not only stimulate aggressions, 
more or less brutal and irritating, upon the admitted rights of colored citizens, but will 
encourage the belief that it is possible, by means of state enactments, to defeat the 
beneficent purposes which the people of the United States had in view when they adopted 
the recent amendments of the Constitution, by one of which the blacks of this country 
were made citizens of the United States and of the States in which they respectively 
reside, and whose privileges and immunities, as citizens, the States are forbidden to 
abridge. 
Id. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id.  In arguing against the Louisiana law which supports segregation, Justice Harlan avers, 
“[t]he arbitrary separation of citizens, on the basis of race, . . . is a badge of servitude wholly 
inconsistent with the civil freedom and the equality before the law established by the Constitution.”  
Id. at 562. 
 79.  I Have a Dream Speech, supra note 9. 
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insights.  The state law degrades black people,80 whereas the core meaning 
of the Reconstruction Amendments is about their equality.81 
One might know it as a human being, but how do you prove it as a 
judge?  The majority Justices in Bush v. Gore82 all knew the Florida court 
was cheating; they just knew it.83  One problem: They didn’t prove it legally, 
and it turned out that they were wrong.84  By contrast, Justice Harlan proves 
his point using scrutiny,85 as Professor Chemerinsky also urged us to do.  So 
what happens when you scrutinize? 
In Korematsu, Professor Chemerinsky’s answer would be that, because 
the government was not going after Italian-Americans and German-
Americans, but only Japanese-Americans, the policy must be racist.  And the 
government’s counter is to emphasize that it is not targeting Chinese-
Americans, or Filipino-Americans, or Vietnamese-Americans.  In other 
words, it’s not quite racial, it’s different.  And it’s because of Pearl Harbor, 
that’s the difference—a sneak attack by Japan.  Thus, scrutiny can be tricky.   
So what does Harlan do?  He observes that there is an exception to the 
segregation law.86  You’re allowed to have a black person in the white car as 
long as she’s a nanny.87  What’s up with the nanny exception?   
Here’s what’s up, the social meaning is clear: you can have a black 
person in the car as long as it’s obvious to everyone that she’s your social 
subordinate, that she’s your domestic, that she’s your servant.  So that’s fine.  
But if you were friends, that’s not okay.  In short, Harlan uses careful 
techniques of scrutiny, of over- and under-inclusiveness. 
A similar situation was presented in Loving v. Virginia,88 where a state 
anti-miscegenation law had the Pocahontas exception.89  Chief Justice Earl 
Warren wrote the opinion invalidating this law.90  The idea was that, if 
 
 80.  Plessy, 163 U.S. at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 81.  AMAR, supra note 5, at 407 (noting that equality was among the major themes of the 
Reconstruction Amendments). 
 82.  531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). 
 83.  See Akhil Reed Amar, Bush, Gore, Florida, and the Constitution, 61 FLA. L. REV. 945, 949–
50 (2009) (“[M]any things both large and small that the Rehnquist Court did in the Bush v. Gore 
litigation make the most sense if the U.S. Justices had in fact believed that they were dealing with a 
lawless, partisan state bench trying to steal the presidency for its preferred candidate.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 84.  See id. at 955–56. 
 85.  See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. (“Only ‘nurses attending children of the other race’ are excepted from the operation of 
the statute.”). 
 88.  388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 89.  Id. at 5 n.4. 
 90.  Id. at 2. 
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you’re a descendant of Pocahontas, then it’s alright, because the Virginia 
aristocracy claimed, at least, to have descended from Pocahontas and John 
Rolfe.91  So Warren employs scrutiny and he recognizes, realistically, what 
the state is doing.   
Now, let us turn to Justice Harlan’s three other legal arguments.  The 
first is based on the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.  He 
focuses not just on equal “protection,” but also equal “citizenship,” as the 
first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment provides.92  Harlan stresses that 
all citizens are equal under law.93  That principle of equality, by the way, 
applies against the federal government, too.  It’s called reverse 
incorporation.94  Harlan continues: “In respect of civil rights, all citizens are 
equal before the law.”95  At another point, he appeals to the language of an 
opinion he wrote earlier in Gibson v. Mississippi: “All citizens are equal 
before the law.”96  Harlan is saying, what part of equal don’t you get?  
Everyone understands that this is unequal.  The Fourteenth Amendment says 
equal, but this law is unequal. 
Second, Harlan makes a brilliant argument under the Thirteenth 
Amendment, calling this racial separation a “badge of servitude . . . . [that] 
practically[] puts the brand of servitude and degradation upon a large class 
of our fellow-citizens, our equals before the law.”97  When he uses the word 
“brand,”98 he’s not talking about Coke versus Pepsi.  He’s referring to how 
human beings under slavery were branded like cattle.99 
The Thirteenth Amendment doesn’t prohibit badges of slavery by its 
terms.100  So why is the Thirteenth Amendment relevant?  Here’s why, and 
this is very important: Because Congress had already prohibited race 
 
 91.  Id. at 5 n.4. 
 92.  Plessy, 163 U.S. at 554–55 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  The first sentence of the Fourteenth 
Amendment reads, “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”  U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV. 
 93.  Plessy, 163 U.S. at 556 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 94.  See Akhil Reed Amar, Constitutional Rights in a Federal System: Rethinking Incorporation 
and Reverse Incorporation, in BENCHMARKS: GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSIES IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 71, 79 (Terry Eastland ed., 1995) (Reverse incorporation means that “the federal 
government is obligated to abide by the same constitutional duty of equal protection that is imposed 
upon the states.”). 
 95.  Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 96.  Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 591 (1896); see also Plessy, 163 U.S. at 556 (Harlan, 
J., dissenting) (quoting Gibson). 
 97.  Plessy, 163 U.S. at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  See Frederick Douglass, Address Delivered in Taunton, England: The Horrors of Slavery 
and England’s Duty to Free the Bondsman (Sept. 1, 1846), in THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS: 
SERIES ONE—SPEECHES, DEBATES, AND INTERVIEWS 371 (John W. Blassingame et al. eds., 1979) 
(“The process of branding was this—A person was tied to a post, and his back, or such other part as 
was to be branded, laid bare; the iron was then delivered red hot (sensation), and applied to the 
quivering flesh, imprinting upon it the name of the monster who claimed the slave.”). 
 100.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
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discrimination in a statute passed in 1875 that forbade racial inequality in 
hotels, motels, theaters, inns, steam ships, and railroads.101  The Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 was originally passed in 1875, and is in large part Charles 
Sumner’s Civil Rights Bill.102  And what happened to it?  It got struck down 
by the Supreme Court, eight-to-one, in the Civil Rights Cases of 1883,103 
with Justice Harlan dissenting.104  Why?  Because the Court said the 
Fourteenth Amendment is only about state action, and this law is regulating 
private action.105  Harlan points out that the first sentence of the Fourteenth 
Amendment doesn’t say “no state shall,” but rather that everyone’s equal, 
everyone’s a citizen.106  What it means to be a citizen is to have rights that 
white people are bound to respect.  This amendment overrules Dred Scott.107  
Dred Scott actually wasn’t just about government action, it was about 
societal understanding.108  An amendment designed to overturn Dred Scott 
allows Congress to pass laws regulating even private race discrimination.109  
That’s one of his arguments.  His second argument in the Civil Rights Cases 
is that the Thirteenth Amendment has no state action requirement.110  
Congress has the power to prohibit all the relics, badges, and incidents of 
slavery.111  Race discrimination is one of those.112   
Here’s what Justice Harlan is really saying in Plessy: I was right in the 
Civil Rights Cases of 1883.  You should have upheld that congressional 
statute prohibiting badges of servitude.  If we did so, the case at hand is a 
simple preemption case.  Congress, in effect, already prohibited this sort of 
thing.  We don’t even need to reach the Constitution.   
 
 101.  Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, § 1, 18 Stat. 335. 
 102.  Id.; see also Ronald B. Jager, Charles Sumner, the Constitution, and the Civil Rights Act of 
1875, 42 NEW ENG. Q. 350, 363 (1969) (“[O]n December 1, 1873, [Sumner] made one last eloquent 
plea on behalf of civil rights. . . . [but] did not live to see the Senate pass the bill substantially as he 
had presented it.”). 
 103.  The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25–26 (1883). 
 104.  Id. at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 105.  Id. at 11, 17–18, 24 (majority opinion). 
 106.  Id. at 46–48 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 107.  AMAR, supra note 5, at 380 (“The Fourteenth Amendment’s text began by repudiating the 
racialist vision of American identity that had animated Chief Justice Taney’s infamous Dred Scott 
decision.”). 
 108.  See id. at 381–82. 
 109.  The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 30–32 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 110.  Id. at 35–36. 
 111.  Id. at 35. 
 112.  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 562 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The arbitrary 
separation of citizens, on the basis of race, . . . is a badge of servitude wholly inconsistent with the 
civil freedom and the equality before the law established by the Constitution.”), overruled by Brown 
v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 88 
Today’s Court is more inclined to strike down civil rights laws than 
previous Courts were.  The Warren Court never struck down civil rights 
laws,113 but William Rehnquist’s Court did strike down civil rights laws,114 
and the Roberts Court is tempted to strike down civil rights laws.  If you 
think Harlan was right in Plessy, if you think Plessy belongs in the hall of 
shame, the Civil Rights Cases of 1883 are right there with it, and you should 
know that, because they’re being revived. 
Harlan’s final argument is rooted in the Fifteenth Amendment.  He 
again uses the legal realist idea: it’s just not equal.  He invokes the 
Fourteenth Amendment; not just its equal protection language, but its 
citizenship language.115  He evokes the Thirteenth Amendment vision.116  
The Fifteenth Amendment is also about racial equality.117  Harlan 
characterizes the Fifteenth Amendment as being not just about voting 
equality, but also equality in a jury box, because people vote in a jury box.118  
Equality in a political assembly, because people vote in a legislature.119  
Equality on the battlefield, where blacks and whites shed their blood 
together.120  These are political rights, not just narrow civil rights.  Here’s 
what he’s saying—that the Fifteenth Amendment is intrinsically 
integrationistic.121  We must have blacks and whites together in a jury box, 
or in the legislative assembly.122  He talks about brother jurors,123 and people 
who are brothers in arms who bled together in the Civil War.124 
In closing, Harlan’s vision is not just of liberty and equality, but of 
genuine fraternity.  It’s an integrationist vision.  It’s a vision of people 
coming together.  Here we come not just to Brown v. Board of Education, 
but also to Dr. King’s speech, which was also mentioned as iconic.  How 
does Dr. King end?  He talks about blacks and whites, Jews and Gentiles, 
 
 113.  See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964) (“The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
as here applied, we find to be plainly appropriate . . . .  We find it in no violation of any express 
limitations of the Constitution and we therefore declare it valid.”); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. 
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (similarly upholding the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
 114.  See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not provide Congress with the authority to enact the Violence Against Women Act); 
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that the Freedom Restoration Act exceeded 
Congress’s enforcement powers). 
 115.  Plessy, 163 U.S. at 555 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be 
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude.”). 
 118.  See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 562–63 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 119.  See id. at 563–64. 
 120.  See id. at 561; see also AMAR, supra note 5, at 358 (discussing black Americans’ 
involvement in the Civil War). 
 121.  See AMAR, supra note 5, at 399–400. 
 122.  See id.; Plessy, 163 U.S. at 562–64 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 123.  Plessy, 163 U.S. at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 124.  Id. at 561. 
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Catholics and Protestants, holding hands and singing together in the words 
of the great Negro spiritual, “Free at last!  Free at last!  Thank God 
Almighty, we are free at last!”125 
  
 
 125.  I Have a Dream Speech, supra note 9. 
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